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RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
ETAPE V. CHERTOFF: FEDERAL COURTS RETAIN 
EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION WHEN A NATURALIZATION 
APPLICANT FILES A TIMELY PETITION FOR REVIEW OF 
A NATURALIZATION APPLICATION PURSUANT TO 
8 U.S.c. § 1447(B). 
By: Michael Gillman 
In a matter of first impression, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit held that a federal court is vested with exclusive 
jurisdiction when a naturalization applicant timely files a petition in 
federal court pursuant to 8 U.S.c. § 1447(b) (2000). Etape v. Chertoff, 
497 F.3d 379 (4th Cir. 2007). More specifically, a federal court will 
not be divested of its power when the United States Bureau of 
Citizenship and Immigration Services ("CIS") fails to make a timely 
ruling on a naturalization application. Id. at 379. 
Max Alobwede Etape ("Etape") and Sawsan Abdul Rahim 
("Rahim") both filed naturalization requests with the CIS and 
appeared for their examinations. Etape filed his application on April 
2,2003 and appeared for his initial examination on September 9,2003. 
Upon arrival, Etape was issued a continuance letter requesting 
additional documentation. Thereafter, he filed the documentation and 
requested that CIS resume adjudication of his application. After 
twenty months had elapsed since his application, Etape exercised his 
right to petition in the district court pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b) 
("section 1447(b)"). On October 18, 2005, CIS denied Etape's 
application before the district court acted upon the motion. Rahim 
filed her application on January 18, 2005 and appeared for her 
examination on June 14, 2005. When more than 120 days had 
elapsed, Rahim filed a petition under section 1447(b). On February 
28, 2006, before the district court could act upon her petition, CIS 
denied her application. 
In both cases, the United States District Court for the District of 
Maryland dismissed the pending petitions as moot. The district court 
reasoned that its ability to consider the petitions depended on the 
applications that were undecided by CIS. When CIS denied the 
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applications, the petitions were rendered moot. The district court also 
concluded that section 1447(b) did not deprive the CIS of jurisdiction 
over Etape's and Rahim's applications after they had filed petitions in 
federal court. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit consolidated the two cases and reviewed de novo the district 
court's grant of dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(1). 
The Fourth Circuit utilized United States v. Hovsepian in its 
analysis. Etape, 497 F.3d at 382. In United States v. Hovsepian, the 
Ninth Circuit held that section 1447(b) vested exclusive jurisdiction in 
the federal district court and prevented CIS from further action on an 
application until the court remands the matter back to CIS. Etape, 497 
F.3d at 382 (citing United States v. Hovsepian, 359 F.3d 1144, 1159 
(9th Cir. 2004) (en banc)). The Fourth Circuit agreed with Hovsepian 
and held that section 1447(b) established exclusive jurisdiction in the 
federal courts. Etape, 497 F.3d at 381. The Court examined the 
language of the statute, determined the proper interpretation of that 
language, and investigated the language of section 1447(b) in the 
larger statutory context. Etape, 497 F.3d at 382. 
The Court began by examining the plain language of the statute. 
Id. at 383. The language of section 1447(b) provides the district courts 
with two options once it has obtained jurisdiction. Etape, 497 F.3d at 
383. The district courts can either "'determine the matter,''' or it may 
'''remand the matter, with appropriate instructions, to the [CIS] to 
determine the matter. '" Id. (alteration in original) (quoting section 
1447(b)). Based on the plain meaning of the statute, the Court 
concluded that a district court is vested with exclusive jurisdiction 
until the circuit court remands the matter back to CIS if it should 
choose to do so. Etape, 497 F.3d at 383. Any other reading of the 
statute would inappropriately result in the administrative agency's 
action divesting the district court of its congressionally authorized 
jurisdiction. Etape, 497 F.3d at 383-84. 
Next, the Court interpreted the significance of the word "remand" 
in section 1447(b). Etape, 497 F.3d at 383-84. The power of 
"remand" is given to a court so that it may send the matter back to its 
origin for some further action, which clearly defines a hierarchal 
structure between the courts and agencies. Etape, 497 F .3d at 384. 
The Court stated that Congress would not have granted district courts 
the power to remand if applications remained with CIS after the matter 
was filed in federal court. Id. The Court observed that otherwise there 
would be no need for the district court to remand the case because CIS 
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would retain jurisdiction. Id. In addition, the Court detennined that 
such a situation would severely limit the district court's power to 
remand. Id. Congress gave the power to the district court to remand a 
case to CIS "with appropriate instructions." Id. The Court refused to 
interpret a statute in a manner which would render some of its 
language meaningless. Id. 
The Court then examined the statutory context of section 1447(b), 
which was enacted as part of the Immigration Act of 1990 (the "Act"). 
Etape, 497 F.3d at 385. The Fourth Circuit held that the Act, as a 
whole, vests a district court with exclusive jurisdiction over a 
naturalization application. Id. at 385. Section 1447(b) was enacted as 
part of an effort to streamline the naturalization process by giving 
authority to the Attorney General to naturalize citizens without 
pennission from a district court. Id at 385-86. However, Congress 
also recognized the district courts' long-standing power over 
naturalization applications. Id. at 386. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit 
detennined that district courts retained their power to review 
applications under the Act. Id. The Court reasoned that the 
Legislature intended to ensure that district courts have the final say 
regarding naturalization applicants. Id. 
The Court next examined 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c), which states that an 
applicant for naturalization has a choice of either having the oath of 
the allegiance given by the Attorney General or by an eligible court. 
Etape, 497 F.3d at 386. Congress enacted section 1447(b) for the 
same reason that it enacted section 1421(c). Etape, 497 F.3d at 386. 
Congress' intention in enacting section 1421(c) was to assure that any 
judicial review rights given to applicants in previous legislation were 
not taken away. Etape, 497 F.3d at 386. The Court detennined that it 
was the applicant and not the government who decides the place, 
setting, and time frame in which the application is processed. Id. 
Judicial review affords the applicant this power. Id. 
The Court concluded that the "twin congressional goals of 
streamlining" the naturalization process while retaining an applicant's 
judicial rights, as well as the applicant's ability to choose the forum 
that will adjudicate his or her application, are consistent with its 
holding that section 1447(b) vests the district court with exclusive 
jurisdiction. Etape, 497 F.3d at 386. The dissent argued that this 
holding severely diminishes the importance of CIS's expertise and 
purpose in the naturalization application process. Id. The majority 
responded that CIS's investigatory functions occur before or during 
the initial naturalization exam, and those exams always occur before 
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the district court obtains jurisdiction. Id. Congress set up this system 
so that CIS can, and must, employ its expertise before a district court 
can act, and only when it fails to act can a court obtain jurisdiction. Id. 
at 386-87. This holding merely furthers congressional intent to allow 
an applicant to choose where and when his or her application will be 
heard. Id. at 386. Because these cases presented a matter of first 
impression, the Court decided to apply this decision retroactively only 
to those cases still open on direct review. Id. at 388. 
By holding that a district court retains exclusive jurisdiction over a 
properly filed section 1447(b) motion, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is asserting that it will use a strict 
statutory interpretation to deduce Congress' intent when enacting a 
statute. The Court shows its willingness to aid those applicants who 
have been kept waiting for an unreasonable amount of time by 
allowing them to retain control over when and where their application 
is adjudicated. In addition, the holding also shows the reluctance with 
which the Court will cede absolute power to an administrative agency. 
While the Court recognizes the importance of efficiency by delegating 
some authority to CIS, it still desires to maintain the power to review 
some types of applications. By retaining a power of review over some 
of the applications, the Court was able to preserve Congress' intention 
that the judiciary should maintain some control over naturalization 
applications. This holding will also affect many currently pending 
naturalization applications on direct review. It will encourage CIS to 
process naturalization applicants in a more timely and efficient 
manner, as CIS knows for certain that there is the possibility it will 
lose the authority to render a decision on an application which is not 
acted upon expeditiously. 
